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Abstract: This paper studies an energy trading and pricing problem for microgrids with uncertain
energy supply. The energy provider with the renewable energy (RE) generation (wind power)
determines the energy purchase from the electricity markets and the pricing strategy for consumers
to maximize its profit, and then the consumers determine their energy demands to maximize their
payoffs. The hierarchical game is established between the energy provider and the consumers.
The energy provider is the leader and the consumers are the followers in the hierarchical game.
We consider two types of consumers according to their response to the price, i.e., the price-taking
consumers and the price-anticipating consumers. We derive the equilibrium point of the hierarchical
game through the backward induction method. Comparing the two types of consumers, we study
the influence of the types of consumers on the equilibrium point. In particular, the uncertainty of
the energy supply from the energy provider is considered. Simulation results show that the energy
provider can obtain more profit using the proposed decision-making scheme.
Keywords: microgrid; uncertainty; hierarchical game; non-cooperative game (NCG); energy trading;
pricing strategy
1. Introduction
In the microgrid, energy trading is an important segment [1,2]. The energy provider determines
the energy purchase to meet the consumer demands. Meanwhile, in order to increase its profit,
the energy provider faces a problem of pricing decision. With the development of renewable energy
(RE), it is reasonable for the energy provider to use the renewable energy as supply [3,4]. Due to
the introduction of the renewable energy, the energy provider has to predict the generating capacity
of the renewable energy system, and then decides how much energy it needs to purchase from the
electricity markets. The energy provider’s prediction can have a deviation from the actual generation,
which leads to the uncertainty (UC) of the energy supply [5–7].
There are some works in literature related to the interactions among the consumers.
A non-cooperative game (NCG) was formulated among the consumers in [8–14]. In [9],
the price-taking consumers and the price-anticipating consumers were considered. The price-taking
consumers assume that their energy consumption cannot affect the electricity price, whereas the
price-anticipating consumers believe that their energy consumption can change the electricity price.
Recently, the Stackelberg game (SG) is formulated between the energy provider and the consumers in
[15–20]. In addition, the authors in [20,21] took into account a two-stage Stackelberg game between
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the power station and the consumers. In order to reduce the cost of the energy purchased from
the electricity markets, the renewable energy was taken into account in [22]. Most of these works
mainly focus on the price-taking consumers, and they seldom take into account the renewable energy
generation, thereby the uncertainty of the energy supply is not involved. The differences of the
proposed work with the above literature are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Differences of the proposed work with the literature.










[15–21] × × ×
√
This work
√ √ √ √
In this paper, we consider the uncertainty of the energy supply caused by the wind power
generation. Furthermore, we both consider the price-taking consumers and the price-anticipating
consumers. We model the interactions between the energy provider and the consumers as a three-stage
hierarchical game. The energy provider, which is the hierarchical game’s leader, determines the price
and the energy purchase to maximize its profit. Finally, we obtain the equilibrium of the hierarchical
game through the backward induction method [23,24].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the problem formulation.
Section 3 shows the backward induction method of the three-stage hierarchical game for the energy
provider and the price-taking consumers. In Section 4, the backward induction method of the
three-stage game for the energy provider and the price-anticipating consumers is described. Section 5
gives the simulation and comparison results. Finally, the conclusions are summarized in Section 6.
2. Problem Formulation
We consider the energy trading and pricing problem in the microgrid consisting of one energy
provider and a set N = {1, ..., N} of consumers. The energy provider and the consumers are integrated
into a microgrid with renewable energy generation. The energy provider purchases energy from
the electricity markets when the renewable energy supply is not enough. In that case, the energy
supply includes the energy generated from the renewable energy source and the energy purchased
from the electricity markets. In the microgrid, the system structure of the energy trading is given in
Figure 1. Because of the uncertainty of the energy generated from renewable energy sources, the energy
purchased from the electricity markets is uncertain. According to the interaction between the energy
provider and the consumers, we establish a hierarchical game as below.
• Leader: the energy provider determines the energy purchase and the pricing strategy to maximize
its profit.
• Followers: the consumers determine the energy demands to maximize their payoffs.
According to the types of the consumers, we consider two scenarios in this paper. In scenario A,
there is no competition among the price-taking consumers, i.e., the consumers’ energy consumption
cannot affect the price announced by the energy provider. In scenario B, the interactions among the
price-anticipating consumers are formulated into a non-cooperative game, i.e., the consumers’ energy
consumption can change the price announced by the energy provider [9].















Figure 1. The system structure of energy trading.
3. Wind Power Generation Model
There exists a large body of literature on wind power forecasting, and the day-ahead wind
forecast based on numerical weather prediction (NWP) models can enable relatively accurate wind
forecasts [25,26]. Because the operating time moves closer to the near term, the computation
complexity often renders NWP models intractable at a high spatial resolution [26]. An adaptive
wavelet neural network was proposed for mapping the NWP’s wind speed and wind direction
forecasts to wind power forecasts in [27]. The authors in [28] proposed a novel statistical wind power
forecast framework, which leverages the spatio-temporal correlation in wind speed and direction data
among geographically dispersed wind farms. In [29], the author developed a feed-forward neural
network approach for wind power generation forecasting to improve the wind forecasting accuracy.
However, the wind power forecast is relatively complex, and the forecast errors cannot be avoided.
Generally, the wind speed can be approximated as the Gamma distribution [30], inverse Gaussian [31],
log-normal [32], and Weibull [33–36]. Alternatively, copula theory has recently been applied to wind
speed and wind power as a way of modeling nonlinear dependence structures [37]. According to the
wind speed, we establish the wind power generation model adopting the mixed copula function in
this paper. Firstly, we introduce the copula theory.
The copula theory was proposed by Sklar in 1959 [38]. Supposing that F(x1, x2, · · · , xN) is a
joint distribution function whose marginal distributions are F1(x1), F2(x2), · · · , FN(xN), then there is a
copula function C satisfies [39]:
F(x1, x2, · · · , xN) = C(F1(x1), F2(x2), · · · , FN(xN)). (1)
Defining that F−11 (u1), F
−1
2 (u2), · · · , F
−1
N (uN) are the pseudo inverse functions of
F1(x1), F2(x2), · · · , FN(xN), respectively. Therefore, the copula function C can be obtained as
the following:
C(u1, u2, · · · , uN) = F(F−11 (u1), F
−1
2 (u2), · · · , F
−1
N (uN)), (2)
where the marginal distributions of C(u1, u2, · · · , uN) follow uniform distribution in [0, 1] [40].
When N = 2, the copula function C is a binary function. H(x1, x2) is a joint distribution
function whose marginal distributions are F(x1) and W(x2), and F−1(u) and W−1(v) are the pseudo
Energies 2017, 10, 670 4 of 16
inverse function of F(x1) and W(x2), respectively. Therefore, the copula function C is expressed as
the following:
C(u, v) = H(F−1(u), W−1(v)). (3)
The mixed copula function was further proposed in [41,42]:
CM(u, v) = λ1C1(u, v, γ1) + λ2C2(u, v, γ2) + λ3C3(u, v, γ3), (4)
where CM(u, v) is the mixed copula function that is composed of C1(u, v, γ1), C2(u, v, γ2),
and C3(u, v, γ3). λ1, λ2, and λ3 are weight coefficients of C1(u, v, γ1), C2(u, v, γ2), and C3(u, v, γ3),
respectively, and satisfy λ1 + λ2 + λ3 = 1. γ1, γ2, and γ3 are correlation coefficients and can measure
the correlation degree of variables.
The results of [41] showed that the relevant structures of the mixed copula function are more
flexible than a single copula function. The wind power generation model is established by the mixed
copula function (see details in [38]).
4. Scenario A: The Three-Stage Game for Price-Taking Consumers
In this section, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the hierarchical equilibrium by using the
backward induction method. First, we analyze the consumers’ demands given the energy provider’s
pricing strategy and energy purchase. Then, we study the energy provider’s pricing strategy given the
consumers’ energy demands and the energy purchase. Finally, we analyze the energy purchased from
the electricity markets in the case of uncertain renewable generation, and then obtain the maximum
profit of the energy provider.
4.1. Consumer’s Energy Demands in Stage III
In Stage I, the energy provider needs to determine the energy purchased from the electricity
markets. In Stage II, the energy provider announces the price to the consumers. In Stage III,
the consumers determine their energy demands given the unit price p announced by the energy
provider in Stage II. The payoff of consumer i is defined as the difference between the satisfaction level
and the payment for energy purchase, i.e.,
ui(p, ci) = −h(ci − c
′
i)
2 − pci, (5)
where h is the consumers’ cost coefficient, ci is the actual energy demand of the consumer i,
and c
′
i is the energy demand of the consumer i to maintain normal operation of appliances.
The consumers determine their demands to maximize their payoffs. p is a fixed price announced by
the energy provider.
The first derivative of ui(p, ci) with respect to ci is:
∂ui(p, ci)
∂ci
= −2h(ci − c
′
i)− p. (6)
Letting ∂ui(p, ci)/∂ci = 0, we obtain:
−2h(ci − c
′
i)− p = 0, ∀i ∈ N. (7)
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Adding Equation (8) from 1 to N, we obtain the total energy consumption of all consumers:
∑
i∈N








We assume that Q = ∑i∈N c
′
i for convenience. When all consumers’ total demands are ∑i∈N c
∗
i (p),
the payoffs of the consumers are at a maximum. Next, we consider how the energy provider makes
the purchase strategy and pricing strategy in Stages I and II based on the total energy demands,
respectively. In particular, we show that the energy provider can determine a price in Stage II such
that the total energy demands (as a function of price) cannot exceed the total energy supply.
4.2. Optimal Pricing Strategy in Stage II
In Stage II, the energy provider determines the pricing strategy according to the consumers’
energy demands, given the energy purchase in Stage I. The profit of the energy provider is denoted by:
W(ps, β) = min(p ∑
i∈N
c∗i (p), p(β + β0)ps)− µβ0 ps − pwβps, (10)
which is the difference between the revenue and the total cost. We assume that ps is the summation of
the energy generated from the renewable energy source and the energy purchased from the electricity
markets. β0 ps indicates the energy purchase, β is the uncertainty factor of the renewable energy
source, βps is the wind power generation, and µ is the energy provider’s cost coefficient. In this paper,
the energy provider’s cost comes from the energy purchase and the wind power generation. pw is
the cost coefficient and pwβps is the wind power generating cost. Equation (10) denotes the fact that
the revenue of the energy provider is determined by the consumers’ demands subject to its available
supply. In Stage II, the objective is to find the optimal price p that maximizes the energy provider’s
profit, i.e.,
WI I(ps, β) = max
p≥0
W(ps, β), (11)
where WI I(ps, β) denotes the maximum profit of the energy provider in Stage II. Since the energy
supply ps from the energy provider is given in this stage, the total cost µβ0 ps is already fixed.





c∗i (p), p(β + β0)ps). (12)
Let us define the consumers’ energy demands D(p) = p ∑i∈N c∗i and the energy supply





S(p) = p(β + β0)ps. (14)
From the above equations, we observe that D(p) is a quadratic function, and S(p) is a linear
function. Thus, we can obtain the maximum point of D(p) at pd = Qh/N. The relationships between
S(p) and D(p) are described in Figure 2.







Figure 2. The relationships between S(p) and D(p).
• S1(p) (excessive supply): S1(p) doesn’t intersect with D(p), p∗ = pd;
• S2(p) (excessive supply): S2(p) has one intersection with D(p), where D(p) has a
non-negative slope, p∗ = pd;
• S3(p) (conservative supply): S3(p) has one intersection with D(p), where D(p) has a
negative slope, p∗ = ph, where ph is the intersection point of D(p) and S(p) and p∗ is the
optimal price announced by the energy provider.




+ (Q− (β + β0)ps)p = 0. (15)
Solving the above Equation (15), we obtain the intersection point of D(p) and S(p):
ph =
2h(Q− (β + β0)ps)
N
. (16)




− µβ0 ps − pwβps. (17)
In the conservative supply regime, the maximum profit of the energy provider is at p = ph:
WCSII =
2h(Q− (β + β0)ps)
N
(β + β0)ps − µβ0 ps − pwβps. (18)
The optimal pricing decision and the corresponding optimal profit at Stage II are given in Table 2
Table 2. Optimal pricing decision and profit in Stage II in scenario A.
Total Energy Obtained Optimal Price Optimal Profit
in Stages I and II p*(ps,β) W II(ps,β)
Excessive Supply Regime: ps ≥ Q2 pES = pd WESII (ps, β) in Equation (17)
Conservative Supply Regime: ps < Q2 p
CS = ph WCSII (ps, β) in Equation (18)
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4.3. Energy Supply Strategy in Stage I
In Stage I, the energy provider determines the energy purchase to maximize its profit by taking
into account the uncertainty factor of the energy supply β [15]. The profit of the energy provider in the
Stage I is given as follows:
WI = max
ps≥0
WI I(ps, β), (19)
where WI I(ps, β) is the energy provider’s profit functions with respect to ps and the uncertain factor β
obtained in Stage II.
We assume that the wind power generation P = βps, and the minimum power and maximum
power of the wind power generation are Pmin and Pmax, respectively. The probability density function
of the wind power fWP(P) can be obtained in [38]. From Figure 2, we can obtain that the maximum
consumers’ demands ∑i∈N c∗i (p) is Q/2 when the price p is Qh/N. Thus, we consider the following
two intervals:
(1) Interval I: ps ∈ [0, Q2 ]. In this interval, the energy provider’s profit function is:






WCSII (P) fWP(P)dP. (20)
(2) Interval II: ps ∈ [Q2 , ∞]. The energy provider’s profit function is:
W2I I(ps) =EP∈[Pmin, Q2 ]












By comparing Interval I with Interval II, we can obtain the maximum profit of the energy provider
and the optimal energy purchase in scenario A.
5. Scenario B: The Three-Stage Game for Price-Anticipating Consumers
Since the price is set by the energy provider based on the total energy consumption, the consumers
are interactive with each other. Thus, we formulate a non-cooperative game among the consumers.
The non-cooperative game has a unique Nash equilibrium if p(c) is a linear rotational symmetric
function, and p(c) is formulated as follows [8]:
p(c) = ω ∑
i∈N
ci + p0, (22)
where ω is a positive parameter to implement the elastic pricing, ci is the actual energy demands of
the consumer i, and p0 is a basic price.
5.1. Consumer’s Energy Demands in Stage III
In Stage I and Stage II, the energy provider determines the energy purchased from the electricity
markets and the pricing strategy for the consumers, respectively. In Stage III, similar to Equation (5),
we formulate the payoff of price-anticipating consumer i given the unit price p(c) announced by the
energy provider as follows:
ui(p(c), ci) = −(h(ci − c
′
i)
2 + bi)− p(c)ci, (23)
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where h and c
′
i were defined in Equation (5), and bi is a base value of the satisfaction level of consumer
i and is different for each consumer, which reflects the flexibility of the consumers. The first derivative
of ui(c) with respect to ci is:
∂ui(c)
∂ci




ci − p0. (24)





ci − p0 = 0, ∀i ∈ N. (25)
Adding Equation (25) from 1 to N, we have:
−2h ∑
i∈N










p0 = 0, (26)







2h + ω(N + 1)
. (27)







p0 = G, (28)





2h + ω(N + 1)
. (29)
5.2. Optimal Pricing Strategy in Stage II
In Stage II, the energy provider determines the pricing strategy according to the consumers’
energy demands, given the energy purchase in Stage I. The profit of the energy provider is:
W(ps, β) = min(p(c) ∑
i∈N
c∗i (ω), p(c)(β + β0)ps)− µβ0 ps − pwβps, (30)
and the maximum profit of the energy provider is:
WI I(ps, β) = max
ω≥0
W(ps, β), (31)
where WI I(ps, β) denotes the maximum profit of the energy provider in Stage II. We can maximize the





c∗i (ω), p(c)(β + β0)ps). (32)
Let us define the consumers’ total energy demands D(ω) = p(c)∑i∈N c∗i and the energy supply
S(ω) = p(c)(β + β0)ps. Then,
D(ω) =
ωG2
[2h + ω(N + 1)]2
+
p0G
2h + ω(N + 1)
, (33)
and the intersection point of D(ω), and the y-axis is p0G/2h.
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(2h + ω(N + 1))2
− 2ω(N + 1)G
2
(2h + ω(N + 1))3
− p0(N + 1)G
(2h + ω(N + 1))2
=
2hG2 −ω(N + 1)G2 − 2hp0(N + 1)G− p0ω(N + 1)2G





2h(G− p0(N + 1))
G(N + 1) + p0(N + 1)2
, (35)
∂D(ω)
∂ω > 0, so D(ω)is an increasing function. When
ω >
2h(G− p0(N + 1))
G(N + 1) + p0(N + 1)2
, (36)
∂D(ω)
∂ω < 0, so D(ω) is an decreasing function.
Letting ∂D(ω)/∂ω = 0, we obtain:
ω0 =
2h(G− p0(N + 1))





2h + ω(N + 1)
+ p0(β + β0)ps, (38)
and the intersection point of S(ω), and the y-axis is p0(β + β0)ps.





2h + ω(N + 1)
− ωG(β + β0)ps(N + 1)
(2h + ω(N + 1))2
=
2hG(β + β0)ps
(2h + ω(N + 1))2
.
(39)
Since ∑i∈N c∗i > 0 and ∂S(ω)/∂ω > 0, S(ω) is an increasing function. The relationships between


















Figure 3. The relationships between S(ω) and D(ω) under the different conditions.
(a) When G− p0(N + 1) < 0, we can obtain the following conclusions from Figure 3a:
• S1(ω) (excessive supply): p0(β + β0)ps ≥ p0G/2h, ω∗ = 0,
• S2(ω) (conservative supply): p0(β + β0)ps < p0G/2h, ω∗ = ωp,
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where ωp is the intersection point of D(ω) and S(ω), and ω∗ is the optimal parameter of the
elastic price.
Because p(c) is a linear rotational symmetric function, the case with ω∗ = 0 is neglected.
(b) When G− p0(N + 1) ≥ 0 and p0(β + β0)ps ≥ p0G/2h, we have the conclusions by analyzing
Figure 3b:
• S3(ω) (excessive supply): S3(ω) has one intersection with D(ω), where D(ω) has a
non-negative slope, ω∗ = ω0,
• S4(ω) (conservative supply): S4(ω) has three intersections with D(ω), ω∗ = ωp,
• S5(ω) (conservative supply): S5(ω) has one intersection with D(ω), where D(ω) has a
negative slope, ω∗ = ωp.
(c) When G − p0(N + 1) ≥ 0 and p0(β + β0)ps < p0G/2h, we can get the conclusions from
Figure 3c:
• S6(ω) (excessive supply): S6(ω) doesn’t intersect with D(ω), ω∗ = ω0,
• S7(ω) (excessive supply): S7(ω) has one or two intersections with D(ω), where both intersections
are located in the increasing interval of D(ω), ω∗ = ω0,
• S8(ω) (conservative supply): S8(ω) has two intersections with D(ω), where both intersections are
located in the both sides of ω0, respectively, ω∗ = ωp.
Letting D(ω) = S(ω), we obtain a quadratic function with respect to ω and make it equal to zero:
(G(N + 1) + p0(N + 1)2)(β + β0)psω2 + [(4hp0(N + 1) + 2hG)(β + β0)ps
− (Gp0(N + 1) + G2)]ω + 4h2 p0(β + β0)ps − 2hp0G = 0.
(40)
For convenience, we define:
A = G(N + 1) + p0(N + 1)2,
B = 4hp0(N + 1) + 2hG,
C = Gp0(N + 1) + G2,




(B(β + β0)ps − C)2 − 4A(β + β0)ps(D(β + β0)ps − E).
Solving the above Equation (40), we obtain the intersection point of D(ω) and S(ω):
ωp =
−(B(β + β0)ps − C) + ∆
2A(β + β0)ps
. (41)
In the excessive supply regime, the maximum profit of the energy provider is at ω = ω0:
WESII =
[G + p0(N + 1)]2
8h(N + 1)
− µβ0 ps − pwβps. (42)
In the conservative supply regime, the maximum profit of the energy provider is at ω = ωp:
WCSII =
(C− B(β + β0)ps + ∆)G(β + β0)ps
4Ah(β + β0)ps + (C− B(β + β0)ps + ∆)(N + 1)
+ p0(β + β0)ps − µβ0 ps − pwβps. (43)
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The optimal pricing decision and the corresponding optimal profit in Stage II are given in Table 3.
Table 3. Optimal pricing decision and profit in Stage II in scenario B.
Total Energy Obtained Optimal Parameter Optimal Profit
in Stages I and II p*(ps,β) W II(ps,β)
Excessive Supply Regime: ps ≥ A4h(N+1) ω
ES = ω0 WESII (ps, β) in Equation (42)
Conservative Supply Regime: ps < A4h(N+1) ω
CS = ωp WCSII (ps, β) in Equation (43)
5.3. Energy Supply Strategy in Stage I
In Stage I, the energy provider also determines the energy purchase to maximize its profit by
taking into account the uncertainty of the energy supply. The profit of the energy provider in the
Stage I is given by:
WI = max
ps≥0
WI I(ps, β), (44)
where WI I(ps, β) is the energy provider’s profit function with respect to ps and the uncertain factor β
obtained in Stage II.
We assume that the wind power generation P = βps, and the minimum power and maximum
power of the wind power generation are Pmin and Pmax, respectively. The probability density function
of the wind power fWP(P) can be obtained in [38]. From Figure 3, we can obtain that the maximum
consumers’ demands ∑i∈N c∗i (ω) is A/4h(N + 1) when ω = ω0. For convenience, we assume that
L = A/4h(N + 1) and consider the following two intervals:
(1) Interval I: ps ∈ [0, A4h(N+1) ]. In this interval, the energy provider’s profit function is:
W1
′








(2) Interval II: ps ∈ [ A4h(N+1) , ∞]. The energy provider’s profit function is:
W2
′
I I (ps) = EP∈[Pmin, A4h(N+1) ]












Similar to scenario A, we can obtain the maximum profit of the energy provider and the optimal
amount of energy purchased from the electricity markets.
6. Simulation Results
This section presents simulation studies of the proposed scheme using MATLAB 7.11.0
(MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA). In the simulations, we assume that the wind power generation
follows a uniform distribution in [Pmin, Pmax], and we select that h = 0.04, p0 = 0.1, N = 100,
and µ = 10. For the parameter c
′
i, we select a set of stochastic values. Then, we can obtain the profit of
the energy provider under different β0 for two scenarios as shown in Figures 4 and 5, respectively.
From Figures 4 and 5, we observe that the optimal energy supply decreases with the increase of
the β0 and the maximum profit is changed from Interval II to Interval I. In general, the wind power
generation cost is less than the cost of purchasing energy. From the profit function of the energy
provider, when β0 increases, only by decreasing ps can the profit of the energy provider be maximized.
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Thus, it is verified that the proposed method is effective, and the simulation values of Figures 4 and 5
are shown in Table 4.








































Interval I Interval II
Figure 4. Scenario A: the profit of the energy provider under different β0.






































Interval I Interval II
Figure 5. Scenario B: the profit of the energy provider under different β0.
Table 4. Simulation values of the two scenarios.
Scenario A Scenario B
β0 ps Profit ps Profit
0.1 349 33.79 399.6 31.52
0.3 246 34.61 288.6 33.27
0.6 186 35.2 209 35.13
Taking β0 = 0.1 as an example, the comparisons between the two scenarios are shown in Figure 6.
From Figure 6 and Table 4, we observe that the energy provider can obtain more profit in scenario A.
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Figure 6. Comparisons between Scenario A with Scenario B.
To explain the effect of the uncertainty, taking β0 = 0.6 under scenario A as an example, we
show the profit of the energy provider under the certain and uncertain energy supply in Figure 7.
It is observed that the energy provider can achieve the higher profit under the certain energy supply.
In reality, the uncertainty of the energy supply is necessary because the energy generated from the
renewable energy sources is uncertain.


































Figure 7. The effect of the uncertainty of the energy supply.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we establish a model for energy trading and pricing in the microgrid. We formulate
a hierarchical game between the energy provider with the renewable energy generation and
the consumers, e.g., the price-taking consumers and the price-anticipating consumers. In the
hierarchical game, the energy provider acts as the leader and the consumers act as the followers.
The equilibrium point of the hierarchical game is obtained through the backward induction
method. Furthermore, we also consider the uncertainty of the energy supply in the problem
formulation. The simulation results show that the optimal energy supply can be obtained based
on the reasonable pricing strategy and purchase strategy. Comparing the price-taking consumers with
the price-anticipating consumers, we can obtain that the energy provider obtains more profit from the
price-taking consumers. From the simulation results, we also can obtain that the energy provider’s
profit reduces because of the uncertainty of the energy supply.
However, we do not consider that the consumers can sell the energy to the energy provider when
the consumers have photovoltaic (PV) panels and a storage system. In that case, the energy demands
of the consumers will be uncertain, and the payoff of the consumer includes two additional parts: one
part is the PV generation cost, and the other part is the uncertainty of the energy demands. In order to
Energies 2017, 10, 670 14 of 16
compute the payoff of the consumer, we need to know the distribution that the PV generation follows.
Then, we can get the average payoff of the consumer by expectation, and the optimal energy demands
are obtained by the derivation method. Simultaneously, the profit of the energy provider needs to
introduce two additional parts that denote buying the energy from the consumers and selling the
energy to the electricity markets, which will be considered in the future.
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